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As this magazine goes to press, there is being waged in the
Supreme Court of the United States a battle royal over the
constitutionality of the income tax, passed by the Congress
which has just expired. There is a growing tendency in our
American public thought to turn from the decisions of our
legislatures, on lines of governmental policy, to the courts.
All legislation is rapidly tending to become unconstitutional
in the eyes of those who do not want it. Our own prepos-
sessions are, we confess, strongly against an income tax of any
kind at the present time. But it cannot be too often repemted
that the economic expediency of the tax is not before the
court, but rather the power of Congress to pass such a tax at
this or any other future time, no matter what may be the needs
of the government to secure a large revenue. The power of
the government to raise money through taxation is essential
to its existence, and should, it seems to us, be curtailed by
constitutional provision and interpretation as little as possible.
There are three reasons, or classes of reasons, which are
being urged on the court to induce the judges to declare the
law void. First, it is said to be a direct tax, and, as such, not
laid in the manner provided for in the Constitution. Second,
it is said to be a class tax, and, thirdly, an unequal tax. Let
us look at each of these objections in the order named.
The second section of the first article of the Constitution
provides that ".. direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several states . . . according to their respective numbers,"
and the ninth section of the second article says, that "no
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion
to the census hereinbefore directed to be taken." It is need-
less to point out the fact that this peculiar provision in the
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Constitution of the United States was the outcome of state
jealousies at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. It
always has been, and always will be, a bugbear in the way of
just aad equitable taxation on land or on anything else which
the Sapreme Court declares falls in the class on which taxa-
tion, when laid, is declared to be direct taxation. For instance,
a tax on land must be assessed according to its value, or
according to its acreage. Whether a tax on the rents received
from land is a tax on land, is a mooted question, and one of
the minor points presented by this case. - Whether Congress
adoptS, in assessing taxes on land, the acreage or the value as
the basis of the assessment, the tax, instead of falling equally
throughout the Union on lands of equal value or equal area,
falls, in consequence of this obnoxious provision in the Con-
stitution, in a different ratio on the lands of each state. The
value of land per capita in New York may be twice as great
as the value of land per capita in Texas, or vi-e versa. In the
foriner case the rate in New York would be twice as great as
the rate in Texas. For instance in the income tax of 1861
(12 Stat. at Large, 294), New York was taxed two million one
hundred and sixteen thousand dollars and over, while Pennsyl-
vania was taxed one million nine hundred thousand. Yet the
relative value of the land in the two states was not as the tax.
To declare an income tax, or any other tax, a direct tax, is
equivalent to saying that Congress cannot pass such a tax
without committing great inequality and injustice-practically,
that Congress cannot tax the subject at all, except possibly in
time of war, because the rate at which any income would be
taxed would vary in each state. This, it may be urged, is treat-
ing the question only from, the standpoint of practical expe-
diency. However undesirable the method for assessing direct
taxes, the provision in the Constitution, as to the manner in
which such tax should be assessed, is plain. This is true, but
what is meant by the term " direct taxes," is not at all plain.
If we put the question " what did the Constitutional Conven-
tion mean by 'direct taxes?"' the only answer which historical
records give us is, that the term "direct taxes" was used in as
loose and indefinite way by our ancestors as it is by ou'r
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modern political economists.' Since the words themselves will
bear almost any construction which the court in its wisdom
chooses to put upon them, and since to declare a tax a direct
tax is practically to say that Congress has no power to pass
such a tax, every consideration of public policy would seem to
urge the court to curtail in the present instance as they have
curtailed in the past, the definition of direct taxes under the
Constitution, confining the meaning of the term to a capitation
tax-and a tax on land. When the words of the Constitution
will admit of one of two meanings, one of which causes the
instrument to provide for injustice and inequality, that mean-
ing should not be adopted. This was the gist of Mr. Justice
CHASE'S argument in the case of H.Fylton v. United States
(3 Dall. 171). The question there was whether a tax on
carriages was a direct tax. He says (p. 174): " If it is pro-
posed to tax any specific article by the rule of apportionment,
and it would evidently create great inequality and injustice, it
is unreasonable to say, that the Constitution intended such tax
should be laid by that rule." 2
The case was followed in that of Springer v. United States
(102 U. S, 586), a case in which the Supreme Court, without
a dissenting a voice, declared an income tax constitutional and
not a direct tax.
It may be an unwise economic policy which to-day passes
an income tax; but the court is deciding not only for to-day,
but for all future time. Those who are asking the judges
to declare the tax a direct tax are asking them to say,
that no matter what the financial strait of the national govern-
ment, money cannot be raised by an income tax, though this
method of procuring revenue has been adopted by our
government in time of great financial need, and is now in
operation in almost every civilized country of the world.
If an income tax is not a direct tax, it is undoubtedly
within the power of Congress to say that all incomes, except
I See review of historical matter in op. of Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in case
of Springer v. United States, 102 U. S., p. 592, et sec.
2 Such substantially is Hamilton's Argument. See Works, Vol. VII,
p. 848, where his brief as counsel in the case is given.
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those received as salaries from the state government, or as
interest on the bonds of the states, shall be taxed.
The next question is, therefore, whether in laying such a
tax Congress can define the class of incomes to be taxed,
saying that all over a certain amount shall be taxed, while
those under that amount are exempt. It is admitted by all
that a wide discretion is vested in Congress, in defining a class
of subjects to be taxed. For instance, Congress can tax all
wagons; they can also tax all pleasure carriages; or, curtail-
ing the class still more, all pleasure carriages with two wheels;
or, still .again, all pleasure carriages with two wheels of a
diameter over a certain number of inches. However foolish
such fine distinctions would be, one would hardly contend
that Congress had exceeded the discretion vested in it of
selecting the class of property to be taxed. Again, Congress
can undonbtedly tax the income of all persons of a particular
class, as, all the fees of brokers or the gains of all bankers.
Now, the critical point, in the case before the court, is whether
the line can be drawn, not as to sources of income but as
to amount of income. The old income tax drew the exemp-
tion line at six hundred dollars. This tax draws it at four
thousand dollars. If this limit is unconstitutional, the old
limit is also unconstitutional. The question of where the
limit should be drawn, if it can be drawn at all, is simply a
matter for Congress to determine. If Congress has no power
to make one limit, it has no power to make another. This
general argument may be excepted to on the theory that,
while all exemptions in an income tax are unconstitutional,
one limit, as an exception, will be admitted-that is, where
the income of the person who would otherwise be taxed is
so small that there is danger of his becoming a charge on the
community. It might be contended that while Congress had,
as a general proposition, no right to exempt any income, no
matter how small, a very low limit might be upheld, perhaps,
-on some new theory of the police power.
The main question, therefore, in this case, is whether there
is vested in Congress any discretion, in laying an income tax,.
to say that incomes under a certain point will not be taxed.
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Those who advocate the curtailment of the power of Congress
in this respect, in order to sustain their arguments, imme-
diately put an extreme case. We have heard, for instance, an
argument like this:
"Supposing Congress were to tax incomes over one hun-
dred thousand dollars, eighty per cent., while exempting all
below one hundred thousand dollars. Would this not clearly
be an unwarranted exercise of congressional discretion for
the purpose of confiscating the property of a particular class
of people?" For one, we would have no hesitation in answer-
ing such a question in the affirmative. But the main ground on
which the unconstitutionality of such an act would rest, would
not be that the line was drawn at one hundred thousand
dollars, but that the amount of the tax, in view of the narrow
class on which it fell, rendered the whole proceeding not a
law, but a tyrannous exercise of arbitrary power. The
present income tax is exceedingly moderate in amount. It is,
in no sense, a confiscatory tax. True, it only falls on prop-
erty of a particular class, i. e., property received by persons
having more than four thousand dollars a year. But the clas-
sification of subjects to be taxed is under the discretion of
Congress. The only limit which can fairly be put on this dis-
cretion is, that the amount of the tax, in connection with the
subject taxed, must not be so arranged as to amount to a con-
fiscation of the special subject on which the tax is laid.
While admitting the strength of many of the able arguments
now being urged before the Supreme Court on this point by those
opposed to the tax, the radical fault of all seems, to the writer, to
be that it is assumed the income tax is a tax on persons rather
than a tax on property. If it was a tax on persons, a sort of
capitation tax, no one would doubt its unconstitutionality.
The Congress has no more right to say that persons of over
four thousand dollars income shall be taxed a definite sum per
capita, while those under four thousand dollars shall be exempt,
than they have to tax all people over six feet high. But it is
a principal of taxation that a tax falls on that which is the
basis of its assessment. The basis here is 'income, not the
individual. The tax is paid by individuals ; but that can be said
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,of all taxes. The tax is a tax on property received during
the year over four thousand dollars, not a tax of so much a
person on all persons having an income of over four thousand.
The third argument against the tax is that it is unequal-
that is, falling on persons or things of the same' class
unequally. There are many supposed inequalities pointed
out. One of the chief is as follows: If I have an income
from the bonds and stock of corporations, I have to pay the
tax, even though I have an income of less than four thousand
dallars a year. I suppose it will be admitted by all that a tax
on the dividends of corporations is constitutional; also that
there is no constitutional prohibition against taxing two
subjects in the same tax law. It seems to us that this is all
that Congress has done in the act in question. They have not
taxed one person twice for the same property, and another
person once for the same species of property; but they have
taxed all incomes from corporations and all incomes which
exceed four thousand dollars, allowing those persons who
have already paid a tax on corporation stocks and bonds to
deduct that tax from the income tax which they would other-
wise have to pay. Wherein, as a resfilt of the whole law, is a
man who has to pay an income tax, because his income is
over four thousand dollars, better or worse off, because of the
possession of property in corporations? The "man who has
not an income of four thousand dollars cannot complain if the
United States chooses to tax his income from a specific class
of property.
Another complication of the law is the tax on incomes from
inheritances of personal property. All men who receive inherit-
ances are not taxed, but only those who receive inheritances of
personalty which, coupled with their income during that year,
exceed the sum of four thousand dollars. We fail to see why,
if Congress can fix any lower limit of taxation on money
received during the year, they cannot particularize what shall
be considered income. Declaring that money from gift or
devise shall be considered as income for the purposes of the
assessment, and selecting a definite class of property, so
received, as personal property, does not viciate the tax other-
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wise constitutional. This last claim of inequality, therefore,
really comes back to what we have stated to be, in our
opinion, the crucial point of the case: that is, whether Con-
gress can draw any lines in an income tax, exempting incomes
under a particular figure.
We might also point out that on the decision of this point
there depends another and still more important question. If
Congress cannot draw any lines, below which incomes will be
exempt, neither can they draw any lines making different rates
of taxation for different incomes, as all incomes above five
thousand dollars, three per cent., between four and five
thousand, two per cent, and under four thousand, one per
cent. Thus an adverse decision of the court in this case
would prevent Congress from passing what is known as
proportional income tax, or a proportional tax of any kind.
If this present tax is unconstitutional on the ground of in-
equality, the income tax of 1862 was void. That law taxed
incomes over six hundred dollars, at the rate of three per
cent., while incomes over three thousand dollars paid five per
cent.
